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While the importance of Scottish common sense philosophy to the
political debates, which occurred in Britain at the end of the eighteenth
century has been recognized,1 its complex influence remains little under-
stood. Scottish common sense philosophy was not only connected with
the rejection of ‘Metaphysicks’, as is often assumed, but was used to form
constructive replies to radicalism. Further, in the attempt to find practical
answers to the social debates of the 1790s, Scottish common sense phil-
osophy made an advance on Romantic aesthetics. The influence of the
Scottish Enlightenment meant that, while the language of the common
man was important, the individual himself took on a new role as aesthetic
judge. This is evident in the work of the self-confessed opponent to
sceptical philosophy, Elizabeth Hamilton.
Critical commentary on Elizabeth Hamilton’s work usually concen-
trates on her participation in the post-French Revolution debate. However,
Hamilton’s later work uses both common sense philosophy and the
association of ideas in an attempt to find workable answers to questions
about (self-) government raised by the political arguments of the 1790s.
Hamilton’s common sense criticisms of radical philosophers implied the
overly imaginative nature of their work and connected their ‘metaphysics’
with the emptiness of fashion. In contrast, Hamilton adopted herself the
common sense position that it was possible to make meaningful assump-
tions about the external world. This led her to argue that, in distinction to
following the arbitrary associations of fashion, all individuals could be
educated to possess a set of appropriate associations that would make
them tasteful. Providing an alternative to what Hamilton saw as the
trend for revolutionary philosophy, taste would in turn improve the com-
munity’s health.
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In this assertion of aesthetic division, Hamilton’s work also illustrates
the importance of Scottish common sense philosophy to a particular
rhetoric of Romantic aesthetics, outlined by Wordsworth in the 1802
preface to The Lyrical Ballads.2 Wordsworth separates texts, readers and
events into two groups: on the one hand, there are works and readers
defined by a ‘degrading thirst after outrageous stimulation’; there is rev-
olution, urbanization and growing consumerism.3 On the other, there are
those works and readers connected with a supposedly more natural and
permanent set of associations. Importantly, Elizabeth Hamilton’s work
illuminates Wordsworth’s position by showing a clear progression from
the common sense suspicion of scepticism, revolution and fashion to
the development of an associationist, romantic aesthetic. In addition, rely-
ing on common associations, Hamilton’s version of taste rewrote older
accounts of taste, in which aesthetic judgement was an exclusive quality,
possessed by the upper ranks and indicative of their ability to rule.
Hamilton’s work demonstrates how Scottish common sense philosophy
and the post-French Revolution debate created the demand for a new, and
potentially radical, democratic account of taste.
The sophistication of Hamilton’s work calls for a critical re-evaluation
of the notion that Scottish common sense responses to radicalism were
‘simple’ rejections of theory unimportant to the development of Romantic
aesthetics. Since Marilyn Butler’s study Jane Austen and the War of Ideas
(1975), a great deal of critical attention has been given to the ‘quixote-like’
hero of conservative novels, who is said to be ‘deluded by [the] revol-
utionary ideas’ of the 1790s.4 However, when examining attacks on the
‘New Philosophy’, critical commentators often accepted at face value
the conservative writers’ propagandist rejections of theory.5 Conservative
novels, it seemed, attacked radical ‘theory’ without having either any
sophisticated philosophical underpinnings of their own or any relevance
to Romantic aesthetics.6 A challenge to this trend was offered by David
Simpson’s Romanticism, Nationalism, and the Revolt against Theory (1993),
which historicized the conservative rejection of theory.7 It became clear
that, in many cases, the Scottish common sense tradition founded by
Thomas Reid formed the intellectual background to conservative
criticisms of the ‘New Philosophy’ and was an important influence on
Romanticism.
Nonetheless, the range and sophistication of its uses remained in doubt,
partly because of confusion surrounding the term ‘common sense’.8 Both
radicals and conservatives used the expression, but the philosophical
strategies of radicals such as Wollstonecraft differed from those of the
conservative writers. Radicals frequently appealed to a ‘common’ reason,
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but, when used by conservatives, the Scottish common sense tradition
could be a powerful weapon against the ‘New Philosophy’. Its insistence
on a knowable external world formed a useful counterargument to
the perceived solipsism of those polemicists who wished to break with
tradition. In addition, for those uncomfortable with Edmund Burke’s
account of tradition as a basis for government, it provided an intellectually
credible option.9 An alternative to following precedent, the common sense
insistence on shared knowledge of the external world underpinned the
Romantic conception of nature as both aesthetic standard and ethical
guide.
The progression from philosophy and politics to aesthetics is evident in
the work of Elizabeth Hamilton. Her initial satires on the incorrect asso-
ciations of sceptics in Letters of a Hindoo Rajah (1796) and Memoirs of
Modern Philosophers (1800) had their basis in common sense philosophy.
Significantly, however, Hamilton also subverted the radical attack on the
corrupting influence of fashion. Instead, Hamilton argued that it was the
sceptical philosophers who were subject to the random associations of
fashion, to which she attempted to provide a more credible alternative.
The result was a common sense account of taste in which the associations
produced by nature had an important ethical role. In The Cottagers of
Glenburnie; A Tale for the Farmer’s Ingle-nook (1808) and A Series of Popular
Essays (1813) Hamilton argued that a shared standard of taste could be
developed through the emotional associations produced by nature. This
would then promote more moral behaviour and provide a vital defence
against both radical philosophy and unthinking adherence to tradition.10
COMMON SENSE, HUME AND ELIZABETH HAMILTON:
THE DANGERS OF IMAGINATION
According to Thomas Reid, David Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature (1739)
‘built a system of scepticism, which leaves no ground to believe any one
thing rather than its contrary’.11 With a hint of the religiosity typical of
common sense philosophy, Reid explained the disastrous results of such
scepticism:
Absolute scepticism is not more destructive of the faith of a Christian,
than of the science of a philosopher, and of the prudence of a man of
common understanding. I am persuaded, that the unjust live by faith
as well as the just; that, if all belief could be laid aside, piety, patriot-
ism, friendship, parental affection, and private virtue would appear
as ridiculous as knight-errantry.12
Reid rejected scepticism on the grounds that he thought that certain
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common conclusions, drawn about ourselves and our relation to the
environment, were obviously correct. He argued that ‘the natural faculties,
by which we distinguish truth from error, are not fallacious’ and con-
sequently hoped to promote ‘a view of the human understanding’ differ-
ent from that provided by ‘Des Cartes, Malebranche, Locke, Berkeley’, and
the most notorious target of his attack, ‘Hume’.13
Both Thomas Reid’s arguments against David Hume, and his vocabulary,
influenced conservative satirists in the post-French revolution debate who
commonly applied them to the ‘New Philosophy’. Accordingly, they asso-
ciated the ‘New Philosophy’ with atheism, revolutionary principles and
the rhetoric of romance, portraying both sceptics and radicals as overly
imaginative. In addition, however, their common sense anxiety about
how evidence from the external world could be verified and interpreted
gave impetus to a growing interest in education. Hamilton exemplifies
both reactions. Her satirical works Translation of the Letters of a Hindoo
Rajah and Memoirs of Modern Philosophers develop the common sense
debate with Hume into a concern with the imaginative processes of meta-
physicians; in her account the weakness of their reasoning leaves them
vulnerable to following intellectual fashion. However, it was Hamilton’s
resultant interest in the development of the human mind that led to her
educational theory of taste.
One of the greatest differences between Hume and the common sense
philosophers, and the most significant for Hamilton, was the treatment
of the association of ideas.14 Hume argued that the imaginative power of
association leads us to suppose that we see cause and effect in the external
world, while all we can really perceive is contiguity and succession.15 In
making this claim, Hume used association to question several principles
which Reid insisted were self-evident. Overall, the implication was that
conclusions about the external world relied on the imagination and might
not be particularly accurate. This emphasis on the imagination meant
that, for Hume, the individual’s judgement was rendered vulnerable,
his opinions easily subject to distortion by others because of difficulty
in verifying their value. Hence, although Hume put considerable stress
on sympathy – an ability to associate emotionally with others – he was
concerned to protect the individual from the pressures and opinions of
the social group. His sympathetic communities were always under erosion
by his concern for privacy and independence, a concern that Reid and
Hamilton saw as potentially solipsistic. Hume’s unease about both the
integrity and the value of the individual’s judgement is particularly evident
in his essay ‘Of the Standard of Taste’. He initially signalled the importance
of sympathy to taste by publishing the essay in Four Dissertations (1757),
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which began with ‘On the Passions’.16 However, in the latter half of ‘Of
the Standard of Taste’, sympathy becomes far from sufficient. There, Hume
sets up a series of tests for the individual judgement, requiring in his
critic ‘practice in a particular art’, the ability to make ‘comparisons …
examin[ing], and weigh[ing] the several performances, admired in differ-
ent ages and nations’, and a removal of ‘prejudice’. This last involves a
knowledge of others’ ‘peculiar views and prejudices’ – a kind of education
in international art, which in turn gives the perspective to remain
detached.17 Elsewhere, Hume even suggests that suspicion and antag-
onism are desirable in encouraging good taste since they will prevent the
‘contagion of popular opinion’.18
In response, common sense philosophers tried to make the association
of ideas fit their own picture of the human mind: they resisted the notion
that their beliefs were based solely on imagination and consequently
vulnerable to fashion. Anxious about mental development, George
Campbell, for example, argued that our assumptions about the external
world were not based solely on imagination. On the contrary, memory and
association were reliable sources of information both when making judge-
ments about the external world and when reasoning about morals.19
According to Campbell, ‘Moral evidence is founded on the principles we
have from consciousness and common sense, improved by experience’
while ‘experience’ consists of ‘retention and association’.20 In Campbell’s
account, ‘this kind of reasoning in its earliest or simplest form’ seems
more-or-less instinctive since ‘little or no reflection is necessary … Every
man will be ready to tell you, that he needs no other witnesses than his
eyes, to satisfy him that objects are not in contact with his body, but are at
different distances from him as well as from one another. So passive is the
mind in this matter …’. This form of reasoning is particularly evident in
childhood and is the most reliable: ‘It is true, indeed, that the conclusions
in the first way, by which also in infancy we learn language, are commonly
more to be regarded as infallible, than those effected in the second.’ 21 For
Campbell the second stage in which associations are more obviously
learnt is a source of unease because the conclusions we reach are no longer
‘infallible’ but subject to error. His sudden introduction of the topic of
childhood into the discussion is suggestive, however, since it opens up the
possibility of the kind of education through association which John Locke
and David Hartley had described. In the common sense account correct
education would produce the necessary memories and associations to
ensure truly correct judgement on which everyone might agree.
This philosophical debate over the development – and reliability – of
the human mind contributed to the increasing politicization of education.
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In the increasingly volatile climate of the 1790s, both radicals and conser-
vatives realized the importance of education to their competing social
visions. Educational theories based on the work of Locke and Hartley were
employed by dissenters including Richard Price and Joseph Priestley,
and later William Godwin, for politically progressive ends. These tended
to emphasize independence. In contrast, other commentators took a
common sense approach and stressed the helpfulness of shared knowl-
edge. Hijacking Hume’s emphasis on the imagination, they argued that it
was the sceptics and the radical philosophers and teachers who were
subject to overly active imaginations. Elizabeth Hamilton, in particular,
initially attacked the potential solipsism of the ‘New Philosophy’ and its
vulnerability to fashion, before developing an alternative theory of taste
based on shared associations.
Although Elizabeth Hamilton recalled reading Lord Kames’s associa-
tionist work, Elements of Criticism (1762) as a young girl, her interest in
philosophical controversy can be traced to the publication of her first
novel, Translation of the Letters of a Hindoo Rajah (1796).22 This satiric
critique of Eastern and Western values contained a lengthy parody of
‘Philosophers[s]’, who, instead of being men ‘“deep in knowledge either
moral or natural” ’, were ignorant individuals, ‘entertain[ing] a high idea
of their own superiority, from having the temerity to reject whatever has
the sanction of experience, and common sense’.23 In the novel’s most
grotesque episode, a young ‘Sceptic’ decides to prove ‘that sparrows may
be changed into honey-bees’ by altering the ‘external circumstances’,
thereby killing hundreds of ‘nestlings’.24 In a letter to Mary Hays, who was
annoyed at the novel’s attack on Godwin, Hamilton claimed that such
instances of philosophical ‘absurdity’ were extremely common:
In my opinion it is a strange sort of a compliment you pay your friend
Mr Godwin, in taking it for granted that he has made a Monopoly
of all the absurdity, and extravagance in the world; and that it is im-
possible to laugh at any thing ridiculous without pointing at him.
Ignorant as I am, and ignorant as to the world you have declared me
to be, I could point out to your perusal volume upon volume where
you might see in the regions of Metaphysicks fancy has taken as bold
a flight and that in the rage for systemizing are those of at least as
distinguished eminence have laid themselves open to ridicule.25
Her remark about the ‘systemizing’ tendencies of her opponents reflects
the typical common sense suspicion that sceptical philosophers con-
structed elaborate theories not supported by empirical evidence – it
was because they were overly imaginative and ignored the evidence of
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common sense that they came to inaccurate conclusions about the
external world. To this common sense observation Hamilton adds an
attack on fashion. She suggests that metaphysicians, following a ‘rage’ in
current philosophy as others might in dress, are ‘extravag[ant]’; fashions
of both sorts lead individuals to put an incorrect or distorted value on what
they see. In radical accounts, such as Wollstonecraft’s, the weakness of
blindly following fashion belongs to those entrenched in the existing
order, women, of course, but, more significantly, priests and soldiers.26
Hamilton moderates this rhetoric by suggesting that radical philosophers
who have ‘no ground to believe any one thing rather than its contrary’ are
equally vulnerable to the unruly associations that characterize fashion.
Elizabeth Hamilton states this at greater length in Memoirs of Modern
Philosophers (1800), where the seducer and false philosopher, Vallaton,
not only changes his opinion according to his convenience but previously
had ‘the task of adorning the heads of his fair country-women’; fashion
and philosophy are again intimately connected.27 Throwing away the
prejudices of tradition, Hamilton argues, the sceptics come to rely, not
on the independent reason they champion, but upon idle and changing
trends which make them look at worst vicious or at best foolish. Brigetina,
for example, who is interested in ‘cowsation and perfebility’, as her mother
puts it, wears a ‘blue gown and yellow slippers’, a wig and ‘stiff turban
and gaudy ribbons’ in a mistaken attempt to look attractive.28 Arbitrary
associations fill her mind, and her appearance connects intellectual
with aesthetic weakness. Parodying Godwin’s Enquiry Concerning Political
Justice (1793), his Memoirs of the Author of ‘A Vindication of the Rights of
Woman’ (1798), and Hays’s Memoirs of Emma Courtney (1796), the book
was Hamilton’s greatest success.29
However, Hamilton was not content with merely attacking those phil-
osophers she associated with Hume’s scepticism; she wished to counter
the influence of the ‘modern philosophers’. She therefore developed a
theory of education which relied upon the association of ideas. In this
account, commonly held associations, based on accurate observation of
the environment, could form a basis for a more moral and, supposedly,
more accurate taste. From Hamilton’s common sense perspective this taste
would not merely be a matter of individual preference but would be widely
agreed upon because of its basis in accurate assumptions about the ex-
ternal world. Her interest in the uses of association was visible in her next
work, Letters on Education. There Hamilton echoed Reid by insisting that
‘rules are less necessary than principles’.30 In his Inquiry into the Human
Mind (1764), Reid had written that while mechanics, astronomy and
optics had rules which could ‘universally obtain’, rules for the mind would
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not work. Instead, Reid maintained a belief in ‘certain principles’ of ‘com-
mon sense’, pp. 9–10, 32). By defending these principles, he attempted to
provide a philosophical alternative to scepticism; in contrast, Hamilton’s
alternative was educational. Having made the case for the harmful effects
of a sceptical or ‘systematizing’ education in her novels, in her pedagogic
writings Hamilton argued that the flexibility of principles rather than rules
was necessary, if the developing mind was to be trained successfully. To
exemplify this, she gave the example of an agricultural improver who,
instead of indiscriminately employing on the Grampian Hills the system
of rules put down by the Devonshire farmer, adopted a more practical,
flexible approach to theory, using general principles.31 With this reference
to farming, Hamilton signalled that her position was as down to earth – as
unextravagant – as the soil itself. In contrast, she implicitly compares the
sceptical philosophers to ‘improvers’ such as Repton and Brown, whose
fashionable theories of landscape management neglected the local and
particular in favour of generalization. Like the over-zealous agriculturist,
Hamilton implied, the so-called systematic New Philosopher does not
inquire into particular circumstances but places an incorrect value on
what he sees – his systems are inflexible, failing to respond to empirical
stimuli. She, on the other hand, wishes to use the principles of asso-
ciationist psychology, drawing upon what people commonly observe and
experience to stabilize the social group. In A Series of Popular Essays and
her last novel, The Cottagers of Glenburnie, Hamilton argued that asso-
ciationism could be used to avoid the folly and violent stimulation of
fashion and generate a correct taste, which would ultimately transform
the whole community.
THE COTTAGERS OF GLENBURNIE AND A SERIES OF POPULAR ESSAYS;
PHILOSOPHICAL ACCOUNTS OF TASTE
Like William Wordsworth’s remarks on the ‘real language of men’, the
titles of both Elizabeth Hamilton’s last novel, The Cottagers, and her
Popular Essays signal a rejection of fashion in favour of something appar-
ently more generally accessible.32 In arguing that taste was essential for
everyone, Elizabeth Hamilton was pursuing what had been for the dis-
course of taste an unusually democratic line. Daniel Cottom has argued
that the eighteenth-century discourse of taste frequently constructed
aesthetic judgement as an exclusive possession, enjoyed by the upper
ranks.33 It was also connected, through the discourse of civic humanism,
with the ability to wield political power. When Sir Joshua Reynolds wrote
that ‘musick is said to have had its origin from a man at leisure listening
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to the strokes of a hammer’ he captured an important truth about eigh-
teenth-century manifestations of taste.34 In this discourse, for there to be
tasteful people, there must be those (the majority) without taste. Taste,
particularly in terms of the eighteenth century, is thus an aristocratic
discourse, one requiring qualifications, particularly connoisseurship, not
generally available.35 Specifically, Reynolds’s listener requires leisure and,
in turn, his leisure and detachment grant him greater authority and judge-
ment than the artisan. He is more fit to rule.
A reaction to the French Revolution, the Romantic suspicion of
fashionable excess contained a potential threat to this exclusivity. It
became increasingly difficult to argue that the supposed taste possessed by
the upper ranks was a secret, unavailable to the majority, or that it rep-
resented their innate right to rule. Instead, it became evident that the rest
of society followed the trends started by the higher orders, giving a
misplaced value to the consumer choices of the privileged. In Elizabeth
Hamilton’s account, both the fine ladies who aped their betters, and the
philosophers who chased intellectual trends were, like David Hume,
followers of fashion – driven by their imaginations to incorrect con-
clusions and prone to neglect the evidence of their senses. Given that
this was seen as socially pernicious, an alternative had to be provided. For
commentators such as Wordsworth and Elizabeth Hamilton it was necess-
ary to distinguish fashion from genuine aesthetic judgement. Words-
worth’s desire to reform poetic language on that used in rustic life is one
such manoeuvre. Elizabeth Hamilton’s narrative of aesthetic improvement
was another, explicitly aimed at the aesthetic life of both the middle and
lower class. Hamilton’s biographer, Elizabeth Benger, suggests the project’s
success by giving the anecdote of an old woman making a profit by hiring
out her copy of the novel to fellow villagers at 1d. a time.36 Hamilton’s
account of taste in the novel connected it, as will be shown, not with the
incorrect associations of fashion but, as she saw it, with a more genuine
attention to the comfort and emotions of others which is applicable in
every social class. To this discussion of taste Hamilton’s Popular Essays
lends a philosophical dimension rather more explicit than that provided
by Wordsworth’s description of ‘philosophical language’ in the Preface.37
Hamilton’s common sense approach and reaction to Hume allowed her
to use the association of ideas to argue for a shared taste which would
guarantee the health of the whole community.
Hamilton’s novel, The Cottagers of Glenburnie, provides a fictional
model of this inclusive process. The work begins with a description of
the visit of its unconventional heroine, spinster and former servant, Mrs
Mason, to Glenburnie. Mrs Mason, who shares her name with the instruc-
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tress in Wollstonecraft’s Original Stories (1788),38 visits the middle-rank-
ing Stewarts before travelling to Mrs MacClarty’s cottage. Mrs MacClarty
(the name means ‘dirty’) lives in a house which is both unattractive and
disregarded, exhibiting a lack of taste and personal responsibility also
evident even in the actions of the youngest children. Jean and her brother
throw mud at the windows after Mrs Mason has cleaned them, reflecting
the MacClarty family’s strange mixture of fashionable aspirations and in-
attentiveness. Mrs MacClarty prevents her children learning household
chores, arguing that ‘they have not been used to [wark]’. She is more
concerned that her children have the leisure enjoyed by the upper ranks
than with the immediate comfort of the household.39 Most significantly of
all, this lack of consideration is connected with a form of mistaken ‘taste’
that places prestige above utility, an error demonstrated in the most trivial
of domestic incidents – supplying refreshments to weary visitors:
Miss Mary Stewart took upon herself the trouble of making tea, and
began the operation by rincing all the cups and saucers through warm
water; at which Mrs MacClarty was so far from being offended, that
the moment she perceived her intention, she stepped to a huge Dutch
press, and having, with some difficulty, opened the leaves, took from
a store of nice linen, which it presented to their view, a fine damask
napkin, of which she begged her to make use.
‘You have a noble stock of linen, cousin,’ said Mrs Mason. ‘Few
farmers houses in England could produce the like; but I think this is
rather too fine for common use.’
‘For common use!’ cried Mrs MacClarty; ‘na, na, we’re no sic fools
as put our napery to use! I have a dizen table-claiths in that press
thirty years old, that were never laid upon a table.’ 40
Mrs MacClarty presumably thinks this linen improves her status, but it
does nothing to make her life easier, more comfortable or more enjoyable.
In order to wipe the crockery tea drinkers use ‘a long blackened rag’,
aesthetically unpleasant and unhygienic.41 Hamilton implies that it is
foolish to think good taste means owning objects which are prestigious
but neither useful nor ornamental – the fact that the dresser holding the
napkins opened ‘with some difficulty’ underlines their impracticality.
In contrast to Mrs MacClarty, those who have good taste have an accu-
rate view of the value of objects in their environment. This is emphasized
in the second half of Mrs Mason’s stay in Glenburnie, when her attempts
at teaching the MacClarty children are contrasted with her fruitful endeav-
ours with the Morisons. An unsuccessful tradesman, Mr Morison lost his
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money by ‘extravagan[ce]’, going into debt for fashionable objects of no
direct use to his family. Educated by Mrs Mason, however, he learns to
improve his situation by valuing objects in proportion to the genuine
comfort they provide. As a schoolteacher he subsequently disseminates
these values, and the result is an improvement in the comfort and beauty
of the whole village. After Morison’s efforts, the ‘bright and clear glass of
the [schoolhouse] windows, was seen to advantage peeping through the
foliage of the rose-trees and other flowering shrubs that were trimly laid
against the walls’.42 This newly found cleanliness and taste, presumably
the result of the school children’s labours, contrast with the dirty window-
panes earlier in the novel. The children’s early act suggests an inability to
perceive the external world reminiscent of Hamilton’s criticisms of the
‘New Philosophers’. In contrast, the newly-cleaned glass promoted by
the now rational associations of the schoolmaster suggests the common
sense position that it is possible to make accurate judgements about
the environment. Reid had argued that ‘the natural faculties, by which
we distinguish truth from error, are not fallacious’; Hamilton’s account
moderates this, positing that the correct operations of these ‘natural
faculties’ are best ensured by sensitivity to the emotions of others and to
the environment. Such sensitivity promotes correct vision by forming
associations built upon the genuine comfort of others.
Reflecting Elizabeth Hamilton’s emphasis on the importance of taste to
the whole community, Glenburnie presents this emotionally responsive
taste as equally important to the lower and middle classes. As Hamilton’s
discussion of dress indicates, each class is vulnerable to the associations
of fashion and requires protection to ensure social harmony. Indicating
that they value prestige more than comfort, the village girls of Glenburnie
veer between the extremes of weekday squalor and Sunday finery. How-
ever, in the middle-class environment of the rectory Miss Stewart, the
eldest daughter, also aspires to gentility. Aspirational but displaying a sad
lack of financial acumen, she describes young ladies being fashionable:
‘I don’t mean those who have fortunes, for there is nothing in that; but
those who have not a shilling to depend on. Yet they are all so fine’ .43 Miss
Stewart’s admiration is reserved for girls who go into debt for their finery;
fashion, it would seem, inspires financial mismanagement. However,
Hamilton argues that the circle of fashion and debt can be broken. With
a tractability more often displayed by fictional than actual adolescents,
Hamilton’s village girls are re-educated in Glenburnie’s new school, and no
longer subscribe to extremes of weekday grime and Sunday best. Rather
than pursuing fashion, they become perpetually neat. This benefits the
community’s appearance, its morality and, most importantly, its stability:
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the school girls’ ‘improvement in personal neatness and good-breeding’
guaranteed ‘the attention they were likely to pay to the instruction of their
teacher in points still more essential’.44
In policing the boundary between the random associations of material
and intellectual fashion and the supposed emotional order of her own
taste, Hamilton comes to a radical conclusion. Her emphasis on emotional
education leads her to reject the position, popular throughout most of the
eighteenth-century, that taste depends upon a connoisseurship charac-
teristically possessed by the upper ranks. Instead, in The Cottagers of
Glenburnie, Mrs Mason, viewing the Scottish countryside, values nature
above art, the ‘works of God’ above those of man:
What are all the works of man, what all the pomp and splendour of
monarchs, compared with the grandeur of such a scene? But the
sights that are designed by man, as proofs of his creative skill, are only
to be seen by the rich and great; while the glorious works of God are
exhibited to all.Pursuing this thought a little farther, it occurred to
Mrs Mason, that all that is rare, is in general useless; and that all that
is most truly valuable is given in common, and placed within the
reach of the poor and lowly.45
Mrs Mason’s values here build on those set up elsewhere in Glenburnie.
Having established that emotional sensitivity and the ability to make the
right associations rely on the assessment of an object’s direct utility, she
dismisses the ‘rare’ art objects. Although these are possessed by the upper
ranks and consequently fashionable, they remain, like Mrs MacClarty’s
linen, ultimately useless, only serving to inspire pointless emulation in
the lower ranks. The natural objects which gave Mrs Mason so much
pleasure, on the other hand, are ‘truly valuable’, that is, both useful and,
by extension, representing a genuine grandeur or sublimity. Hamilton’s
insistence that the aesthetic appreciation of nature is connected with
moral and spiritual health is typically Romantic. Her criticisms of high art
are similar to, though perhaps more extensive than, Wordsworth’s rejec-
tion of ‘sickly and stupid German Tragedies, and deluges of idle and
extravagant stories in verse’.46 However, Hamilton does not want aesthetic
education to be limited by acquaintance with relatively rare cultural
objects of any sort. Instead, she extends the opportunity for correct
aesthetic judgement by basing taste on common emotional associations.
In her Series of Popular Essays Elizabeth Hamilton explains her need to
make taste inclusive; she also explains, in a way reflective of common
sense philosophy, how such a widely available sense of taste is not merely
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a matter of personal opinion, but based on shared associations. The Essays
were dedicated to Archibald Alison, whose Essays on the Nature and the
Principles of Taste (1790) was one of the most completely associationist
accounts given of the faculty.47 While Alexander Gerard and Lord Kames
employed associationism to support neoclassical standards, Alison argued
that personal associations triggered the emotion of taste. Hamilton uses
similar terminology in order first to personalize taste and then to exploit
it for her moral agenda. Hamilton refers to the ‘emotions’ of the sublime
and the beautiful and emphasizes the importance of the individual’s asso-
ciations in facilitating such experiences: ‘In order to excite that emotion
[of beauty], the object must recall to our recollection some pleasurable
feelings or sensations formerly experienced.’ 48 Her interest in making
taste more personal and thereby more widely available quickly becomes
evident. Taste is, she says, ‘seen as connected with the moral principle, and
appears, not indeed as an additional faculty bestowed on a few fortunate
individuals, but as an operation of the mind, to which all the faculties …
and all the affections and sympathies … are alike essential’.49 Having
connected taste with morality, she is anxious to imagine that it is some-
thing that can be possessed by as many people as possible.
However, Archibald Alison’s account potentially allowed for a descent
into the sort of relativism Reid and the common sense philosophers
disliked – based on the random associations made by the individual, taste
might become merely a matter of personal opinion. In contrast, Elizabeth
Hamilton’s common sense background led her to insist that, in taste, as
well as in other matters, there were correct conclusions to be reached.
Hamilton, like Campbell, insists on the common environmental influ-
ences that form our associations in childhood and which affect everyone’s
tastes. Discussing the ‘recollection’ which triggers the emotions of taste,
she selects an association, light, which almost everyone must share, and
which promotes ‘cheerful’ ideas.50 She argues that light produces cheer-
fulness because it is associated with the first consciousness of existence;
she recalls the infants ‘delight’ in seeing ‘luminous objects’ and so first
learning ‘the art of seeing’.51 With this account of childhood, Hamilton, as
David Hartley had done, indicates how general environmental influences
educate our taste, and, importantly, she lays the foundations of a taste
which, although working on personal emotional associations, is similar in
all human beings.52
Elizabeth Hamilton also suggests how this pattern of environmental
associations produces a moral effect. When an external object reminds an
observer of a noble quality or tender feeling, he or she feels the emotions
of taste. As Alison put it:
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Not only the smell of the Rose, or the Violet, is expressed to us by
their Colours and Forms; but the utility of a Machine, the elegance
of a Design, the proportion of a Column, the Speed of the Horse, the
ferocity of the Lion, even all the qualities of the human mind, are
naturally expressed to us by certain visible appearances; because our
experience has taught us, that such qualities are connected with
such appearances. … Such visible qualities, therefore, are gradually
considered as the Signs of other qualities, and are productive to us of
the same Emotions with the qualities they signify.53
Unlike Alison, Hamilton is interested in qualities of the human heart than
those of the mind. Like Wordsworth’s ‘feeling’, her anthropomorphizing
taste fills the observer with ‘the same affections as are inspired by the
proper objects of his love’ and ensures that he will have an enhanced moral
sense towards his family. In turn, his developed responsibility leads to him
only buying those objects which are tasteful because genuinely useful. As
Hamilton expresses it, ‘ideas of utility, or of propriety, fitness, symmetry,
and congruity’ are connected to taste – the tasteful person (who is, in her
account, necessarily considerate) reflects upon the actual benefits an
object will confer.54 Avoiding the mental dependence caused by following
the latest trend, he will become a responsible member of the community,
which should have similar values.
As this emphasis on shared values suggests, Hamilton’s attempt to over-
come the problems of a more inclusive account of taste rewrites Hume.
Hume’s emphasis on the role of the imagination, mentioned earlier, led
him to worry about the possible erosion of individual opinion. Hamilton’s
common sense confidence in being able to arrive at truths concerning the
external world, on the other hand, meant that, unlike Hume in his more
pessimistic moments, she saw an alternative to the continual attrition
of personal belief and opinion. While aware that sympathy may produce
prejudice, she had confidence in an educational system which exercises
‘the attention’ ‘in acquiring clear and distinct ideas’; such an education
would allow the individual to develop his own opinions, which would
then in most cases coincide with those of other people.55 Less worried by
the erosion of self by other, Hamilton is able to select affective criteria as
the correct ones by which to make judgements of taste, in the process
rejecting elitist learning as a basis for the standard.56 Unlike Hume’s critic
in ‘Of the Standard of Taste’, her critic makes comparisons, not between
different artworks, but between feelings. A potentially more inclusive
basis for taste is established, relying on the rejection of high status – and
therefore fashionable – objet d’art in favour of a more precise set of
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emotional and ethical associations gained through the environment.
Elizabeth Hamilton provides one of the clearest examples of the rejec-
tion of the supposed misplaced associations of fashion for the accurate
emotional associations produced by the environment. However, this trend
is also traceable in the work of her friend, Joanna Baillie, and in William
Wordsworth’s 1802 preface to the Lyrical Ballads. Exhibiting the contem-
porary anxiety with fashion (an anxiety increased by the post-French
Revolution debate), all three writers opposed the fashionable to the more
tasteful ‘natural’ – by Baillie defined as the indigenous and the common.
In each case, the opposition to fashion is constructed through a common
sense adaptation of association of ideas; an examination of human
emotion in some area where it is supposedly represented accurately (the
drama, the countryside) develops a tasteful set of associations and enables
accurate and supposedly more permanent conclusions to be drawn about
the world.
Understanding the influence of Scottish common sense philosophy
upon Hamilton sheds valuable light on these characteristic aesthetic
divisions of Romanticism. Her work makes it evident that the rejection of
fashion stems from the implication of the notion of fashion in the philo-
sophical and political conflict of the 1790s. Hamilton employed the
common sense criticisms of scepticism against radical philosophy, taking
Hume’s work on the imagination and arguing that it is the radicals who
are overly imaginative. Adapting the radical rhetoric on the dangers of
fashion, Hamilton argues that, like women and soldiers, ‘metaphysicians’
are subject to the random associations of fashion. In reaction, she attempts
to arrive at an alternative, a more accurate mode of aesthetic judgement.
Based on the common sense proposal that it is possible to arrive at accu-
rate judgements which have reference to an external ‘true’ state of affairs,
Hamilton posits a mode of taste which is available to anyone willing to
give attention to their environment. In its common sense reliance on
building accurate associations from observation of the external world, it
also provides some philosophical basis for the (supposedly) more perma-
nent or natural associations favoured by Wordsworth and Baillie. In this
account, instead of following fashion, individuals could build their taste
on associations given by their environment and, since these would be
similar, expect to reach some agreement over matters of aesthetic judge-
ment. Finally, the radical potential of this approach to taste should not be
forgotten. Common sense philosophy posited a version of a tastefulness
which insisted that taste should no longer be the signal of the upper ranks’
political superiority. For Hamilton, in particular, the common sense pos-
ition that it is possible to reach accurate judgements about the external
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world opens correct aesthetic judgement to everyone. Indeed, in her
narrative it is imperative that individuals strive for accurate obser-
vation and judgement – if they don’t, society might be led en masse
into the mistaken associations characteristic of scepticism, atheism
and revolution. Hamilton’s new aesthetic is based on the belief that for
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